But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in
circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no
citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as
the lowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who
would establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to
consider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which
each individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number
of his children; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of
provision, the law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of
the repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth
to poverty, so difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such
mistakes. That an equality of goods was in some degree serviceable to
strengthen the bands of society, seems to have been known to some of
the ancients; for Solon made a law, as did some others also, to
restrain persons from possessing as much land as they pleased. And
upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their
property, as among the Locrians, unless they can prove that some
notorious misfortuue has befallen them. They were also to preserve
their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken through by the
Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for by that means it
was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain fortune to be
qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods is
established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people
to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard.
Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator to
establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium.
Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a
manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would
be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should
entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of