city, and to buy their wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all
the remains of old laws which we have are very simple; for instance, a
law in Cuma relative to murder. If any person who prosecutes another
for murder can produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own
relations, the accused person shall be held guilty. Upon the whole,
all persons ought to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what
is established; and it is probable that the first men, whether they
sprung out of the earth, or were saved from some general calamity, had
very little understanding or knowledge, as is affirmed of these
aborigines; so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice of
their rules. Nor is it, moreover, right to permit written laws always
to remain without alteration; for as in all other sciences, so in
politics, it is impossible to express everything in writing with
perfect exactness; for when we commit anything to writing we must use
general terms, but in every action there is something particular to
itself, which these may not comprehend; from whence it is evident,
that certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if
we consider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to
require great caution; for when the advantage proposed is trifling, as
the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws is of bad
consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some faults which
either the legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for the
alterations will not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying
the magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought
from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the
one as the other. For a law derives all its strength from custom, and
this requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy
matter to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to
weaken the power of laws. Besides, here is another question; if the
laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in every