they would be useful to the government; but still it might be debated
whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine points
of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well as the
body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the legislator
could not depend upon them as good men, their power must be
inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the
members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality
in many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if
they had been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not.
But it may be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the
magistrates. They have indeed in this particular very great power; but
I affirm that they should not be entrusted with this control in the
manner they are. Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of
at the election of their senators is very childish. Nor is it right
for any one to solicit for a place he is desirous of; for every
person, whether he chooses it or not, ought to execute any office he
is fit for. But his intention was evidently the same in this as in the
other parts of his government. For making his citizens ambitious after
honours, with men of that disposition he has filled his senate, since
no others will solicit for that office; and yet the principal part of
those crimes which men are deliberately guilty of arise from ambition
and avarice.

We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful
to the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a
consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the
legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable
and completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them
as not being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that
were at variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of