9


From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to
describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that
might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary.
The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing
prose and the other verse--you might put the work of Herodotus into
verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really
in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the
other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more
philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements
are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are
singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such
a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do--which is the
aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters; by a
singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to
him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when
their plot is already made up of probable incidents that the.g.ve it
a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names that may
occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about
particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the
historic names; and for this reason: what convinces is the possible;
now whereas we are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which
has not happened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else
it would not have come to pass. Nevertheless even in Tragedy there are
some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being
inventions; and there are some without a single known name, e.g.
Agathon's Anthens, in which both incidents and names are of the poet's
invention; and it is no less delightful on that account. So that one