wild regions traversed, are all essential to success. As regards the
United States, these conditions are wanting. While there are harbours
enough on the Atlantic, though none equal to Halifax, there is no
available harbour at all fit for the great Pacific trade, from Acapulco
to our harbour of Esquimault, on Vancouver's Island, except San
Francisco--and that is in the wrong place, and is, in many states of
the wind, unsafe and inconvenient. The country north-west of the
Missouri is found to be sterile, and at least one-third of the whole
United States territory, and situated in this region, is now known as
the 'Great American Desert.' Again, the conflicting interests of
separate and sovereign States present an almost insuperable bar to
agreement as to route, or as to future 'operations' or control. It is
true that Mr. Seward, possibly as the exponent of the policy of the new
President, promises to support _two_ Pacific Railways--one for the
South, another for the North. But these promises are little better than
political baits, and were they carried out into Acts of Congress,
financial disturbance would delay, if not prevent, their final
realization; and, even if realized, they would not serve the great
wants of the East and the West, still less would they satisfy England
and Europe. We, therefore, cannot look for the early execution of this
gigantic work at the hands of the United States.

"Such a work, however, is too costly and too difficult for the grasp of
unaided private enterprise. To accomplish it out of hand, the whole
help of both the Local and Imperial Parliaments must be given. That
help once offered, by guarantee or by grant, private enterprise would
flock to the undertaking, and people would go to colonise on the broad
tracts laid open to their industry."