account at the close of tho oration on the Chersonese.] and formerly
(they say) to Haliartus, [Footnote: B. C. 395, when the war between
Thebes and Sparta had begun and Lysander besieged Haliartus. He was
slain in a sally by the Thebans and Athenians.] and very lately to
Thermopylae. And although you should not pursue just the course I would
advise, it is no slight matter, that Philip, knowing you to be in
readiness--know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own
people who report every thing to him--may either keep quiet from
apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard,
there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to
attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be
agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in
hand some force, that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of
your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper,
[Footnote: Literally "written in letters," that is, promised to the
generals or allies, but never sent. Jacobs: _eine Macht die auf dem
Blatte steht_. Compare Shakspeare, Henry IV, Second Part, Act i.

We fortify in paper and in figures.
Using the names of men instead of men.]

but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or
more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow
him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how
large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show
you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend--and beware of
doing what has often been injurious--thinking all measures below the
occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish
the least--rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it
afterward, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers