submarine mine fields. Everywhere the eye met evidences of defective
work--rusty contacts, open insulations and exposed connections. There
were carelessly exposed buoys betraying to the naked eye supposedly
invisible submarine mines. The whole mine field was so badly laid
that the Japanese were subsequently able to drag and explode three out
of every five mines. This explains the astounding fact that during
Admiral Togo's five dashes, some of them lasting thirty-six hours, all
that he lost from torpedoes and mines was one ship, the _Hatsuse_,
which struck a floating mine.

I did a great deal of investigating the composition and geological
formation of the ground surrounding Port Arthur. I found most of the
ground consisting of loose layers of lava scoriæ. The comparative
easy capture of the otherwise immensely strong 203 Metre Hill did not
surprise me. The texture of the ground, besides having a deadening
effect on shell fire, made the approach to the forts by means of
parallels surprisingly easy. The Japanese, by the way, also knew this
peculiarity of the ground and used it to great advantage in their
advances. I also found the forts on 174 and 131 Metre Hills as well
as the north fort of East Rekwan in an incompleted state. The
commander of the forts, General Smyrnoff, was using strenuous efforts
to complete the work, but the personal animosity of General
Krondrachinko, the commander of the general defenses, vetoed most of
his suggestions. The vast sums of money which the Russian central
government appropriated for the fortification of Port Arthur, honestly
used, would have made the place completely impregnable. It is not too
much to say--and this will be borne out by any trained observer and
student of the conditions then existing in and around Port
Arthur--that sixty per cent. of the money for defense purposes
disappeared mysteriously.