policy of the German Foreign Office. I learned beyond all doubt that
the Sultan Abdul Hamid was nothing but a figurehead, that the Grand
Vizier, bought by Russian and French gold, was running the government
in a way that was antagonistic to German influences and that the
swarms of demi-mondaines in French and Russian pay were corrupting the
higher Turkish officials to their cause. All these things I included
in my report and after four months I was back in Berlin.

To better understand the diplomatic significance of this mission, I
shall recast the political situation. The modern German policy in the
European Orient, inaugurated by Bismarck as a defense and check
against Russia, has always been keen on the friendship and good will
of the Turk for reasons which will be obvious enough later. During
the Caprivi Chancellorship, the relation between the two empires
became rather lax. Wilhelm II with his keen farsightedness set about
to remedy this. In his usual spectacular, but in most cases
efficient, manner, he went with his royal consort in state to
Palestine, calling first on the Sultan. The tremendously enthusiastic
reception that the Moslem countries accorded him is a matter of
contemporary history. This was really a master stroke of diplomacy
although sharply criticised at the time.

Until the Kaiser's visit, France, with more or less right, considered
herself protector general of all Mohammedans. From now on this began
to change. The immediate result of the Emperor's visit was a close
understanding between the Wilhelmstrasse and the Sublime Porte. The
buying of vast quantities of guns, ammunition, and the influx of
Prussian officers and drilling instructions, besides huge orders of
all sorts of German goods was significant.