being present, and it was decided to evacuate the castle. It could
indeed have been held for some days longer, but it was plain it
would at length become untenable; the bridge of boats had already
been struck in several places, and some of the barges composing it
had sunk level with the water. Were it destroyed, the garrison of
the castle would be completely cut off; and as no great advantage
was to be gained by holding the position, for it was evident that
it was upon the other end of the town the main attack was to be
made, it was decided to evacuate it under cover of night. As soon
as it became dark this decision was carried into effect, and for
hours the troops worked steadily, transporting the guns, ammunition,
and stores of all kinds across from the castle to the town.

Already communication with their friends outside had almost ceased,
for the first operation of the enemy had been to block the approach
to Sluys from the sea. Floats had been moored head and stern right
across Zwin, and a battery erected upon each shore to protect them;
but Captains Hart and Allen twice swam down to communicate with
friendly vessels below the obstacle, carrying despatches with them
from the governor to the States General, and from Roger Williams
to the English commanders, urging that no time should be lost in
assembling an army to march to the relief of the town.

Both contained assurances that the garrison would defend the place
to the last extremity, but pointed out that it was only a question
of time, and that the town must fall unless relieved. The Dutch
garrison were 800 strong, and had been joined by as many English.
Parma had at first marched with but 6000 men against the city, but
had very speedily drawn much larger bodies of men towards him, and
had, as Roger Williams states in a letter to the queen sent from