from Rosecrans's actual route, which he thought impracticable.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. pp. 215, 256, 260. Conduct of
the War, vol. vi. (Rosecrans), pp. 2,3.] The alert which had
occurred at midnight made Rosecrans think it best to make a longer
circuit than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe
marching and mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turning
movement was made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegram had
detached about 350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered
them to guard the road at the mountain summit. He sent with them a
single cannon from the four which constituted his only battery, and
they threw together a breastwork of logs. The turnpike at Hart's
runs in a depression of the summit, and as Rosecrans, early in the
afternoon, came out upon the road, he was warmly received by both
musketry and cannon. The ground was rough, the men were for the
first time under fire, and the skirmishing combat varied through two
or three hours, when a charge by part of Rosecrans's line, aided by
a few heavy volleys from another portion of his forces which had
secured a good position, broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements from
Pegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon; but they did not
come into action, and the runaway team of the caisson on the
hill-top, dashing into the gun that was coming up, capsized it down
the mountain-side where the descending road was scarped diagonally
along it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he was in
possession of the field. The march and the assault had been made in
rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan; and the enemy,
rallying on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance on
the crest a little further on, that Rosecrans directed his men to
rest upon their arms till next morning. When day broke on the 12th,
the enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and Rosecrans,
feeling his way down to the rear of Pegram's position, found it also