and of the abortive efforts to induce the Ameer to comply with our
demands, because it is evident that if he continued to resist compulsion
must almost inevitably ensue. At about the same time, Quetta, in the
Bolam, was occupied by a considerable British force, which was naturally
regarded as a threat on Afghanistan. A concentration of troops also took
place in the Northern Punjaub, and preparations were made for the
construction of bridges over the Indus. All these were indications of
coming war. It must also be noted that our relations with Russia in
Europe were much strained at the time, so that probably the preparations
in India were in some degree due to the apprehension of war in other
parts of the world.

In the summer of 1878 a Russian Envoy arrived at Cabul, which under the
circumstances is hardly to be wondered at. Some months however elapsed,
and it was not until November 1878 that war was declared. Lord Lytton,
the Viceroy, in his proclamation stated: 'That for ten years we had
been friendly to Shere Ali; had assisted him with money and arms; and
had secured for him formal recognition of his northern frontier by
Russia.' It went on to state, that in return he had requited us with
active ill-will; had closed the passes and allowed British traders to be
plundered; and had endeavoured to stir up religious hatred against us.
It then pointed out that whilst refusing a British Mission he had
received one from Russia; and ended by saying that we had no quarrel
with the Afghans, but only with Shere Ali himself.

From official correspondence published subsequently [Footnote:
Parliamentary Papers, _Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 2.--c. 2811.] it
appeared that in entering Afghanistan our chief object at the outset was
to establish what was called a strategical triangle, by the occupation
of Cabul, Ghuznee and Jellalabad; and it was stated that by holding this