and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a
condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country.'

Long and careful consideration was naturally given to the solution of
the difficulty in which this country found itself owing to the untoward
circumstances just related. Two important decisions were however
ultimately arrived at: [Footnote: _Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 1.]

1. That authority in Afghanistan, and the unity of its provinces,
should as far as possible be restored by the appointment of a new Ameer;
and Abdul Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, who had been for twelve years
an exile in Bokhara, was invited to Cabul, and was supported by us in
assuming the title.

The chief conditions were, that his foreign policy was to be under our
guidance, that no English officers were to reside as our representatives
in Afghanistan, and that he was to receive a subsidy.

2. That the British troops should be withdrawn as soon as the
pacification of the country would permit. This decision was recommended
not only by the Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, but by the higher
officers who had held command during the war. Sir Donald Stewart, who
was in chief command, and Sir Frederick Roberts, both, concurred in our
withdrawal from the country; the Kyber Pass was to be held by subsidised
tribes, and the Koorum Valley to be altogether abandoned; the
independence of the tribes being in each case recognised. Sir John
Watson, who was in command in that valley, pointed out that as a route
from India into Afghanistan it was practically useless. As a further
argument in favour of withdrawal, it may be well to allude to the fact
that the men of our native regiments were sick of serving in