Mr. Tucker, of the Court of Directors, wrote to the Duke of Wellington:
'We have contracted an alliance with Shah Soojah, although he does not
possess a rood of ground in Afghanistan, nor a rupee which he did not
derive from our bounty as a quondam pensioner.' He added, that 'even if
we succeed we must maintain him in the government by a large military
force, 800 miles from our frontier and our resources.'

The above were strong and weighty opinions and arguments against the
rash and distant enterprise on which the Government of India were about
to embark. But there is more to be said. Independently of the result in
Afghanistan itself, it must be borne in mind that the proposed line of
march of the army necessarily led through Scinde and Beloochistan,
countries which (whatever their former position may have been) were then
independent both of the Ameer and of ourselves.

The force from Bengal, consisting of about 9,500 men of all arms, with
38,000 camp followers, accompanied by Shah Soojah's levy, left
Ferozepore in December, and crossing the Indus, arrived at Dadur, the
entrance to the Bolam Pass, in March 1839. Difficulties with the Ameers
of Scinde at once arose, chiefly as to our passage through their
territories; but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they were
informed that 'the day they connected themselves with any other Power
than England would be the last of their independence, if not of their
rule.' [Footnote: Kaye's _War in Afghanistan_.]

The army then advanced through the Bolam, and reached Quetta on March
26th. But here again obstacles similar in character to those just
described occurred, and Sir Alexander Burnes visited the ruler of
Beloochistan (the Khan of Khelat), demanding assistance, especially as
to supplies of food. The Prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out that