candidate who encumbered their deliberations. (This latter would be an
effectual way of suppressing the candidature of cranks, and of half-
witted and merely symbolical persons.) The Jury between and after their
interrogations and audiences would withdraw from the public room to
deliberate in privacy. Their deliberations which, of course, would be
frank and conversational to a degree impossible under any other
conditions, and free from the dodges of the expert vote manipulator
altogether, would, for example, in the case of several candidates of
the same or similar political colours, do away with the absurdity of
the split vote. The jurymen of the same political hue could settle that
affair among themselves before contributing to a final decision.

This Jury might have certain powers of inquest. Provision might be made
for pleas against particular candidates; private individuals or the
advocates of vigilance societies might appear against any particular
candidate and submit the facts about any doubtful affair, financial or
otherwise, in which that candidate had been involved. Witnesses might
be called and heard on any question of fact, and the implicated
candidate would explain his conduct. And at any stage the Jury might
stop proceedings and report its selection for the vacant post. Then, at
the expiration of a reasonable period, a year perhaps, or three years
or seven years, another Jury might be summoned to decide whether the
sitting member should continue in office unchallenged or be subjected
to a fresh contest.

This suggestion is advanced here in this concrete form merely to show
the sort of thing that might be done; it is one sample suggestion, one
of a great number of possible schemes of Election by Jury. But even in
this state of crude suggestion, it is submitted that it does serve to
show the practicability of a method of election more deliberate and