venture to think that, after a very brief epoch of fluctuating
legislation, this committee, except for an extremely short list of
absolute prohibitions, would decide to leave matters almost exactly as
they are now; it would restore love and private preference to their
ancient authority and freedom, at the utmost it would offer some
greatly qualified advice, and so released, it would turn its attention
to those flaws and gaps in our knowledge that at present render these
regulations no more than a theory and a dream.

The first difficulty these theorists ignore is this: we are, as a
matter of fact, not a bit clear what points to breed for and what
points to breed out.

The analogy with the breeder of cattle is a very misleading one. He has
a very simple ideal, to which he directs the entire pairing of his
stock. He breeds for beef, he breeds for calves and milk, he breeds for
a homogeneous docile herd. Towards that ideal he goes simply and
directly, slaughtering and sparing, regardless entirely of any
divergent variation that may arise beneath his control. A young calf
with an incipient sense of humour, with a bright and inquiring
disposition, with a gift for athleticism or a quaintly-marked hide, has
no sort of chance with him at all on that account. He can throw these
proffered gifts of nature aside without hesitation. Which is just what
our theoretical breeders of humanity cannot venture to do. They do not
want a homogeneous race in the future at all. They want a rich
interplay of free, strong, and varied personalities, and that alters
the nature of the problem absolutely.

This the reader may dispute. He may admit the need of variety, but he
may argue that this variety must arise from a basis of common