amount, the best thing you could do with the money would be to increase
the establishment by sending a greater number of competent persons as
magistrates, collectors, and officials into the distant provinces, and
thereby double the facilities for good government in those districts. If
you could reduce the income of the Civil Service one half, you could for
the same money have a more efficient Service throughout India than at
present. You might not save money, but you would get a more complete
Service for it.

But the military question the House of Commons will certainly have to
take in hand; though Secretaries for India are afraid to grapple with
it, I am not astonished that they feel some hesitation in doing so, for
from every one connected with the Military Service they would hear the
strongest objections to reducing the number of the troops. But let me
ask the Committee to consider what it has just heard. Before the Revolt
the European troops in India numbered 45,000 and the Native troops
250,000; now the 45,000 European troops are 110,000, and the 250,000
Native soldiers are raised to 300,000. What was it that we heard during
the Indian mutiny; what was the cause of all the letters that appeared
in the newspapers? Every man said that the great evil was having a
Native army far larger than was required. That has been the source of
peril, and that was the real cause of the mutiny. Now we have even a
larger portion of this most perilous element than we had before. The
authorities of India do not appear to have learnt anything from the
mutiny, or they have learnt that all that was said in this House and in
this country was untrue, because they have 50,000 more Native troops
than they had before the mutiny. Therefore, the mode of argument appears
to be this:--A Native army was the cause of the mutiny, the cause of all
our perils, and now it is necessary to have more of it; and, as that is
the perilous element, of course 45,000 troops are not sufficient to keep