taxation. You would have in every Presidency a constant rivalry for
good. The Governor of Madras, when his term of office expired, would be
delighted to show that the people of that Presidency were contented,
that the whole Presidency was advancing in civilization, that roads and
all manner of useful public works were extending, that industry was
becoming more and more a habit of the people, and that the exports and
imports were constantly increasing. The Governors of Bombay and the rest
of the Presidencies would be animated by the same spirit, and so you
would have all over India, as I have said, a rivalry for good; you would
have placed a check on that malignant spirit of ambition which has
worked so much evil--you would have no Governor so great that you could
not control him, none who might make war when he pleased; war and
annexation would be greatly checked, if not entirely prevented; and I do
in my conscience believe you would have laid the foundation for a better
and more permanent form of government for India than has ever obtained
since it came under the rule of England.

But how long does England propose to govern India? Nobody answers that
question, and nobody can answer it. Be it 50, or 100, or 500 years, does
any man with the smallest glimmering of common sense believe that so
great a country, with its twenty different nations and its twenty
languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and
enduring empire? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible. We
must fail in the attempt if ever we make it, and we are bound to look
into the future with reference to that point. The Presidency of Madras,
for instance, having its own Government, would in fifty years become one
compact State, and every part of the Presidency would look to the city
of Madras as its capital, and to the Government of Madras as its ruling
power. If that were to go on for a century or more, there would be five
or six Presidencies of India built up into so many compact States; and