"Question.--Even if you had received a check there, it would have
prevented his junction with the forces at Manassas?
"Answer.--Yes, Sir; I would have risked a battle with my own
division rather than Johnston should have escaped. If he had
attacked me, I could have taken a position where I could have held
it, while Patterson could have fallen upon him and repulsed him."

"Question [by Mr. Odell].--Had you any such understanding with
Patterson?
"Answer.--I told him I would move down on this side-road in
advance, leaving Gen. Patterson to sustain me if I got into a
fight. So, on the other hand, if he should attack Patterson, I was
near enough to fall upon Johnston's flank and to support Patterson.
By using this communication of mine to pass Opequan Creek--where, I
had informed Patterson, I had already pushed forward my pickets,
[200 men in the day and 400 more at night,] to prevent the Enemy
from burning the bridge--it would have enabled me to get between
Johnston and the Shenandoah River. On the morning [Wednesday, July
17th] of our march to Charlestown, Stuart's cavalry, which figured
so vigorously at Bull Run, was upon my flank all day. They were
apparently about 800 strong. I saw them constantly on my flank for
a number of miles. I could distinguish them, with my glass, with
great ease. Finally, they came within about a mile of the line of
march I was pursuing and I sent a battery around to head them off,
and the 12th Regiment across the fields in double-quick time to
take them in the rear. I thought I had got them hemmed in. But
they broke down the fences, and went across the country to
Winchester, and I saw nothing more of them. They were then about
eight miles from Winchester, and must have got there in the course
of a couple of hours. That day [Wednesday, the 17th] at 10