any nearer to the Enemy!

Instead of attacking the Rebel force, under Johnston, or at least
keeping it "employed," as he was ordered to do by General Scott; instead
of getting nearer, and attempting to get between Winchester and the
Shenandoah River, as was suggested to him by his second in command,
General Sanford; and instead of permitting Sanford to go ahead, as that
General desired to, with his own 8,000 men, and do it himself; General
Patterson ordered him off to Charlestown--twelve miles to the Union left
and rear,--and then took the balance of his Army, with himself, to the
same place!

In other words, while he had the most positive and definite orders, from
General Scott, if not to attack and whip Johnston, to at least keep him
busy and prevent that Rebel General from forming a junction, via the
Manassas Gap railroad or otherwise, with Beauregard, Patterson
deliberately moved his Army further away from Winchester and gave to the
Enemy the very chance of escaping and forming that junction which was
essential to Rebel success in the vicinity of Manassas.

But for this disobedience of orders, Bull Run would doubtless have been
a great victory to the Union Arms, instead of a reverse, and the War,
which afterward lasted four years, might have been over in as many
months.

It is foreign to the design of this work, to present in it detailed
descriptions of the battles waged during the great War of the Rebellion
--it being the present intention of the writer, at some later day, to
prepare and publish another work devoted to such stirring Military
scenes. Yet, as it might seem strange and unaccountable for him to pass