- Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its
application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War
(OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it
not, and where might it offer mixed benefits?
- Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance in
both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a form
of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy? Would
this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to our
own public?
- Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances, coalitions,
and the conduct of allied and combined operations?
- Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on defense
resource investment priorities and future budgets?

From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful results
will flow.

We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the National
Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In particular, we
owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts of NDU whose
intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his full support,
have been invaluable and without which this project would have been
far less productive.

Washington, D.C.

1 September 1996

L.A. Edney J.T. Howe
F.M. Franks H.K. Ullman