profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical advantages of the
American economy were never greater and it is small business that is
creating virtually all new jobs and employment opportunities.
Commercial technology and products are turning over on ever shortening
cycles. Performance, especially in high-technology products, is
improving and costs are being driven downwards.

Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector,
where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among
competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle time to
field new generation capabilities is lengthening and performance,
especially in computer and information systems, is often obsolete on
delivery. The defense industrial base will continue to compress and it
is not clear that the necessary level of efficiencies or increases in
effectiveness in using this base can be identified and implemented,
suggesting further pressures on a defense budget that is only likely
to be cut.

Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the
military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot wars
such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships and
submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, technology,
strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our national preference
for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare continues to shape the
way we design and rationalize our military capability. Therefore, it
is no surprise that in dealing with the MRC, American doctrine, in
some ways, remains an extension of Cold War force planning. While the
magnitude and number of dangerous threats to the nation have been
remarkably reduced by the demise of the USSR, we continue to use
technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to identify