To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that one
thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine of overwhelming
or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To push the conceptual
envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: Can a Rapid Dominance
force lead, for example, to a force structure that can win an MRC such
as _Desert Shield_ and _Desert Storm _far more quickly and cheaply
with far fewer personnel than our planned force both in terms of
stopping any invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can
Rapid Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity
to deal with grey areas such as OOTW?

Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of political
deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or "shut down" an
adversary can actually control behavior? What are the possible
political implications of this capability and what would this power
mean for conducting coalition war and for how our allies react and
respond?

Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will, perception,
and understanding of an adversary rather than simply destroying
military capability, this focus must cause us to consider the broadest
spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and across all aspects of war
including intelligence, training, education, doctrine, industrial
capacity, and how we organize and manage defense.

We observe at first that even with the successful ending of the Cold
War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating its national
security and defense has been relatively and understandably modest and
cautious. In essence, while the size of the force has been reduced