It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense through
mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the Second World War
and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming the enemy using the
massive application of force, technology, and associated firepower.
Two decades later, Vietnam exposed the frailty of this approach of
dependence on massive application of firepower especially when
political limits were placed on applying that firepower.

Currently, _Desert Storm_ and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 have
been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the doctrine
of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that both strategic
objectives and tactical methods were in congruence. We argue that now
is the time to re-examine these premises of reliance on overwhelming
or decisive force as currently employed and deployed in the force
structure if only as a prudent check.

Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major threat to
generate consensus and to rally the country around defense and defense
spending, the military posture of the United States will erode as the
defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in the future on what is
currently seen to be as sufficient force to be "decisive" could easily
prove unachievable and the results problematic or worse for U.S.
policy.

The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat is, of
course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining the future
defense posture of the nation. The United States has long resisted
maintaining a large standing military and the Cold War years could
prove an aberration to that history. Extending this historical