ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those
programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D could become
the main source for procuring software and other systems needed to
upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called "leap-ahead"
technologies that may prove elusive to create.

There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing new
doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing
circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and with the clear
bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and defending an
annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, less of the same)
becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While the JCS or OSD or CINCs
may have genuine need for jointly packaged forces that are rapidly
deployable irrespective of Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels,
the services cannot be expected to reverse the years of viewing the
world through service- specific arguments and doctrine.

Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced with the
end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to assume that there
are no risks to the nation nor an absence of evil-doers wishing this
nation harm. It would also be shortsighted to expect that potential
adversaries are unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge
of their environment and simplicity to overcome our current military
and technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In
addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our
assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological superiority
should welcome thoughtful examination.

Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start, the United
States should act to exploit the several major advantages it