against lesser adversaries quite differently than it fought the Cold
War. In the Panama intervention in 1990 and in Kuwait shortly
thereafter, the suggestion of newer and different methods of warfare
was present. Perhaps both will turn out to be transition campaigns,
where there is much of the old, but also signs of the new. But there
are specific pieces of evidence that should command our attention.

Underlying the planning for _Operation Just Cause_ in Panama and
_Desert Shield/Storm_ in Kuwait was the premeditated incorporation of
a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply decisive
force. The aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the enemy through
a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air, and special
operating forces strikes that took place nearly simultaneously across
a wide battle space and against many military targets. The purpose of
these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis
of both the national state and its armed forces that would lead to
prompt neutralization and capitulation.

In both _Just Cause_ and _Desert Storm_, the United States (plus
coalition forces in _Desert Storm_) had such overwhelming military
capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a matter of
drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan based on using the
entire system of capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce
a decisive victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar
principles of intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in
_Desert Storm_ unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its allies nearly 6
months to deploy over a half million troops before the fighting began.

The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5 Pamphlet
reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simultaneity. Yet,