eject Iraq's forces from Kuwait.

Suppose a _Desert Storm_-type campaign were fought 20 years from now
based on a plan that exploited the concept of Rapid Dominance. Further
assume that Iraq has improved (and rebuilt) its military and that, in
a series of simultaneous and nearly instantaneous actions, our primary
objective was still to shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its
leadership, and isolate and destroy its military forces as we did in
1991. However, two decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably
achieve this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not
after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to
1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an
invasion in its tracks.

Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction
of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow
of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to
achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping
nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese.
Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces would be paralyzed with the
neutralization or destruction of its capabilities. Deception,
disinformation, and misinformation would be applied massively.

This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also demonstrate
to the adversary our endurance and staying power, that is, the
capability to dominate over as much time as is necessary less an enemy
mistakenly try to wait it out and use time between attacks to recover
sufficiently. If the enemy still resisted, then conventional forms of
attack would follow resulting in the physical occupation of territory.
Control is thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the