conclusion. After his biting criticism of the many gross errors of
Steinmetz and Zastrow, after his description of the triple panic of
the German troops opposite the French left in the valley and the
ravine of the Mance, he ends by a reflection which serves as a
striking ending to the book. He says, "The grandest illustration of
Moltke's strategy was the battle of Gravelotte-Saint Privat; but the
battle of Gravelotte has taught us one thing, and that is, the best
strategy cannot produce good results if tactics is at fault."

The right kind of tactics is not improvised. It asserts itself in the
presence of the enemy but it is learned before meeting the enemy.

"There are men," says Ardant du Picq, "such as Marshal Bugeaud, who
are born military in character, mind, intelligence and temperament.
Not all leaders are of this stamp. There is, then, need for standard
or regulation tactics appropriate to the national character which
should be the guide for the ordinary commander and which do not exact
of him the exceptional qualities of a Bugeaud."

"Tactics is an art based on the knowledge of how to make men fight
with their maximum energy against fear, a maximum which organization
alone can give."

"And here confidence appears. It is not the enthusiastic and
thoughtless confidence of tumultuous or improvised armies that gives
way on the approach of danger to a contrary sentiment which sees
treason everywhere; but the intimate, firm, conscious confidence which
alone makes true soldiers and does not disappear at the moment of
action."