desire of satisfying a barbarous curiosity. Can a God have any of
these motives? In tormenting the victims of his wrath, he would
punish beings, who could neither endanger his immoveable power, nor
disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other hand, the punishments
of the other life would be useless to the living, who cannot be
witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to the damned,
since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the time
of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of
his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself,
and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole human
race;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do
not say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without
emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing
to fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your
own principles, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst
of men.

Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.
I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite;
that the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God,
who is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences
of his creatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good,
can neither be infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite
duration, solely for the pleasure of eternal torments.

Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery,
or the blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal
punishments. If there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme,
there are not upon earth greater blasphemers than those, who dare
to say, that this same God is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight,