all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree of
goodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would
it not have been shorter not to have made man, than to have created
him a being full of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually
exposed to cause his own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty?

Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only
angels very docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free;
some have sinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty
by revolting against their master. Could not God have created only
angels of the good kind? If God has created angels, who have not
sinned, could he not have created impeccable men, or men who should
never abuse their liberty? If the elect are incapable of sinning
in heaven, could not God have made impeccable men upon earth?


77. Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance
which separates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God
a mystery to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master.
Is this answer satisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake,
have I not a right to examine the conduct of God himself? It is
only in hope of happiness that men submit to the authority of a God.
A despot, to whom men submit only through fear, a master, whom they
cannot interrogate, a sovereign totally inaccessible, can never merit
the homage of intelligent beings. If the conduct of God is a mystery,
it is not made for us. Man can neither adore, admire, respect, nor
imitate conduct, in which every thing is inconceivable, or, of which
he can often form only revolting ideas; unless it is pretended, that
we ought to adore every thing of which we are forced to be ignorant,
and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for that reason