very well-deserved comments. In a second debate the first resolution was
rescinded by a vote of 40 to 38. In the following session the
proposition was renewed with more vigor, and forty-one banks with a
capital of $17,000,000 were authorized by a large majority; the
representations of the Executive proved useless, and they immediately
entered upon their duties with an insufficient capital.

To discount their own stock was a soon-discovered method. They thus
increased the amount of notes, which depreciated in comparison with hard
money, and dissipated on all hands the hope of exchanging with it.

In the absence of a demand from abroad for hard money, the demand came
from within our own borders.

The laws of New England, which were very severe upon the banks, had
placed a penalty of 12 per cent. upon the annual interest payments of
those persons who did not pay their notes. The natural result was a
difference of value between New England and Pennsylvania, which measured
the depreciation caused by paper in the latter district. As remittances
on New England could only be made in hard money, the equilibrium of the
banks was disturbed; they were not able to respond to the demands for
redemption, and a suspension of payments by the banks of the United
States, except those of New England, took place in August and September,
1814.

THE PANIC OF 1814.--An agreement took place at Philadelphia between the
bank and the chief houses allied with it to resume payments at the end
of the war.

Unhappily, the public did not demand the accomplishment of this promise