critical moment having passed, tranquillity reappeared as soon as the
course determined on was known.

If suspension of payment hurts the credit of a bank, it does not
necessarily lead to the depreciation of its bank notes.

There are a good many proofs of this: in 1796, when the Bank of England
suspended, its bank notes did not depreciate; and if this state of
things did not last, the blame must be laid upon the excessive issue.
And in France, in 1848 as well as in 1871, the Bank of France suspended
without the depreciation of its bank notes becoming very noticeable. So,
in New York, bank notes passed at 2 or 3 per cent. loss at this crisis.

The crisis disappeared with the end of the year, and resumption of
payments took place between New York and Hamburg, with the return of
specie and a rate of 4 per cent.

It was the same in France and England. A more serious panic and a more
rapid recovery had never been seen. The rigidness and not the severity
of the pressure that had to be exercised shows the condition of
business. There had been most blamable practices employed; but the
market as a whole was sound, and had faced the storm.

Only four banks had suspended, three of which were shaky before the
panic, and the fourth had already resumed payments.

At no other period could one have obtained such an amount of credit upon
a simple paper circulation; fictitious paper was the source of all the
wrecks. To get it into circulation the most varied contrivances were
resorted to, and fraud itself was not wanting; the signatures even