a number, though much less than that of a common-wealth, will necessarily
keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety
of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in
all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be
only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a
constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter
duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it
was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational
creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved:
for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as
one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
Sec. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a
community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the
ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community,
unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And
this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society,
which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals,
that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins
and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the
consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and
incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which
did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
Sec. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are
no instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and
equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and
set up a government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because
all men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are
not at liberty to begin a new one.
Sec. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all