good actions: next to our own esteem, says the best of the Roman
philosophers, 'it is a virtue to desire the esteem of others.'"

"By your emphasis on the word esteem," said Lady Roseville, "I suppose
you attach some peculiar importance to the word?"

"I do," answered Vincent. "I use it in contradistinction to admiration.
We may covet general admiration for a bad action--(for many bad actions
have the clinquant, which passes for real gold)--but one can expect
general esteem only for a good one."

"From this distinction," said Ellen, modestly, "may we not draw an
inference, which will greatly help us in our consideration of vanity; may
we not deem that vanity, which desires only the esteem of others to be
invariably a virtue, and that which only longs for admiration to be
frequently a vice?"

"We may admit your inference," said Vincent; "and before I leave this
question, I cannot help remarking upon the folly of the superficial, who
imagine, by studying human motives, that philosophers wish to depreciate
human actions. To direct our admiration to a proper point, is surely not
to destroy it; yet how angry inconsiderate enthusiasts are, when we
assign real, in the place of exaggerated feelings. Thus the advocates for
the doctrine of utility--the most benevolent, because the most indulgent,
of all philosophies--are branded with the epithets of selfish and
interested; decriers of moral excellence, and disbelievers in generous
actions. Vice has no friend like the prejudices which call themselves
virtue. La pretexte ordinaire de ceux qui font le malheur des autres est
qu'ils veulent leur bien."