against the millions connected by social order, for the sake of
serving a single family, and that his own?"

"Quite right," answered Crauford: "that was just the point of view in
which I did put it; but the man, who was something of a reasoner,
replied, 'Public law is instituted for public happiness. Now if mine
and my children's happiness is infinitely and immeasurably more served
by this comparatively petty fraud than my employer's is advanced by my
abstaining from, or injured by my committing it, why, the origin of
law itself allows me to do it.' What say you to that, Glendower? It
is something in your Utilitarian, or, as you term it, Epicurean [See
the article on Mr. Moore's "Epicurean" in the "Westminster Review."
Though the strictures on that work are harsh and unjust, yet the part
relating to the real philosophy of Epicurus is one of the most
masterly things in criticism.] principle; is it not?" and Crauford,
shading his eyes, as if from the light, watched narrowly Glendower's
countenance, while he concealed his own.

"Poor fool!" said Glendower; "the man was ignorant of the first lesson
in his moral primer. Did he not know that no rule is to be applied to
a peculiar instance, but extended to its most general bearings? Is it
necessary even to observe that the particular consequence of fraud in
this man might, it is true, be but the ridding his employer of
superfluities, scarcely missed, for the relief of most urgent want in
two or three individuals; but the general consequences of fraud and
treachery would be the disorganization of all society? Do not think,
therefore, that this man was a disciple of my, or of any, system of
morality."

"It is very just, very," said Mr. Crauford, with a benevolent sigh;