statesmen thought it best for the country to remain for the present
neutral. Grant the worst--grant that Harold were defeated or slain;
would it not be wise to reserve their strength to support the
Atheling? William might have some personal cause of quarrel against
Harold, but he could have none against Edgar; he might depose the son
of Godwin, but could he dare to depose the descendant of Cerdic, the
natural heir of Edward? There is reason to think that Stigand, and a
large party of the Saxon Churchmen, headed this faction.

But the main causes for defection were not in adherence to one chief
or to another. They were to be found in selfish inertness, in
stubborn conceit, in the long peace, and the enervate superstition
which had relaxed the sinews of the old Saxon manhood; in that
indifference to things ancient, which contempt for old names and races
engendered; that timorous spirit of calculation, which the over-regard
for wealth had fostered; which made men averse to leave trade and farm
for the perils of the field, and jeopardise their possessions if the
foreigner should prevail.

Accustomed already to kings of a foreign race, and having fared well
under Canute, there were many who said, "What matters who sits on the
throne? the king must be equally bound by our laws." Then too was
heard the favourite argument of all slothful minds: "Time enough yet!
one battle lost is not England won. Marry, we shall turn out fast
eno' if Harold be beaten."

Add to all these causes for apathy and desertion, the haughty
jealousies of the several populations not yet wholly fused into one
empire. The Northumbrian Danes, untaught even by their recent escape
from the Norwegian, regarded with ungrateful coldness a war limited at