An Enquiry into an Origin of Honour; and the Usefulness of Christianity in War by Bernard Mandeville
page 6 of 173 (03%)
page 6 of 173 (03%)
|
most trifling Thing I can readily think on, is as much Eternal, as
that of the Sublimest Virtue. If you ask me, where this Truth was, before there was Mutton, or People to dress or eat it, I answer, in the same Place where Chastity was, before there were any Creatures that had an Appetite to procreate their Species. This puts me in mind of the inconsiderate Zeal of some Men, who even in Metaphysicks, know not how to think abstractly, and cannot forebear mixing their own Meanness and Imbecillities, with the Idea's they form of the Supreme Being. There is no Virtue that has a Name, but it curbs, regulates, or subdues some Passion that is peculiar to Humane Nature; and therefore to say, that God has all the Virtues in the highest Perfection, wants as much the Apology, that it is an Expression accommodated to vulgar Capacities, as that he has Hands and Feet, and is angry. For as God has not a Body, nor any Thing that is Corporeal belonging to his Essence, so he is entirely free from Passions and Fralities. With what Propriety then can we attribute any Thing to him that was invented, or at least signifies a Strength or Ability to conquer or govern Passions and Fralities? The Holiness of God, and all his Perfections, as well as the Beatitude he exists in, belong to his Nature; and there is no Virtue but what is acquired. It signifies Nothing to add, that God has those Virtues in the highest Perfection; let them be what they will, as to Perfection, they must still be Virtues; which, for the aforesaid Reasons, it is impertinent to ascribe to the Diety. Our Thoughts of God should be as worthy of him as we are able to frame them; and as they can not be adequate to his Greatness, so they oughts at least to be abstract from every Thing that does or can belong to silly, reptile Man: And it is sufficient, whenever we venture to speak of a Subject so immensly far beyond our Reach, to say, that there is a perfect and |
|