capital, and unshaken as a rock they resisted, defending themselves with
grim determination. The battle, Napoleon promised, would be followed by
peace and good winter quarters, but he was not as good a prophet as he was
a good general.

During the day the Westphalian corps was reduced to 1500 men. Napoleon
ordered these to do guard-duty on the battlefield, transport the immense
number of wounded to the hospitals, bury the dead and to remain while the
army marched and stayed at Moscow. What the Westphalians could do for the
wounded was very little, for everything was wanting. The hospital system
was incomplete, miserable. It is true, the surgeons dressed, operated,
amputated, during the battle and during the days following, a great many
wounded, but their number and their assistance was inadequate for the
enormous task; thousands remained without proper attendance and died.

About one thousand Wuerttembergians were wounded in the battle of Borodino,
and on many of these surgical operations had to be performed. Strange to
say, the greatest operations on enfeebled wounded were more successful, a
great many more were saved, than was generally the case under more
favorable circumstances. Thus Surgeon General von Kohlreuter observed that
in the Russian campaign amputation of an arm, for instance, gave much
better chances, more recoveries, than in the Saxon and French campaigns,
during which latter the soldiers were still robust, well nourished and
well, even in abundance, supplied with everything.

Means of transportation were lacking, for no wagons could be found in the
deserted villages, and for this reason many whose wounds had been dressed
had to be left to their fate--to die. Those but slightly wounded and those
even who could crawl in some manner followed the troops, or went back at
random to find their death in some miserable hut. Many sought refuge in