Moral Philosophy by S. J. Joseph Rickaby
page 117 of 356 (32%)
page 117 of 356 (32%)
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of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
5. But it has been contended that this phrase about a man who does wrong _breaking a law_, is only a metaphor and figure of speech, unless it be used with reference to the enactment of some civil community. Thus John Austin says that a _natural law_ is a law which is not, but which he who uses the expression thinks ought to be made. At this rate _sin_ is not a transgression of any law, except so far as it happens to be, in the lawyer's sense of the word, a _crime_, or something punishable in a human court of justice. There will then be no law but man's law. How then am I _obliged_ to obey man's law? Dr. Bain answers: "Because, if you disobey, you will be _punished_." But that punishment will be either just or unjust: if unjust, it originates no obligation: if just, it presupposes an obligation, as it presupposes a crime and sin, that is, an obligation violated. There seems to be nothing left for John Austin but to fall back upon Kant and his Categorical Imperative, and say that whoever rebels against the duly constituted authority of the State in which he lives, is a rebel against the reason that dwells within his own breast, and which requires him to behave like a citizen. So that ultimately it is not the State, but his own reason that he has offended; and the State has no authority over him except what his own reason gives. 6. If this were true, there would be no sin anywhere except what is called _philosophical sin_, that is, a breach of the dignity of man's rational nature; and the hardest thing that could be said in reprobation of a wrongdoer, would be that he had gone against himself, and against his fellow-men, by outraging reason, the common attribute of the race. |
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