Moral Philosophy by S. J. Joseph Rickaby
page 133 of 356 (37%)
page 133 of 356 (37%)
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(c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27). An obligation, neglected in
invincible ignorance, makes a merely _material sin_. (c. iii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 33.) 5. There is another element of mind, often confounded under one name with conscience, but distinct from it, as a habit from an act, and as principles from their application. This element the schoolmen called _synderesis_. [Footnote 10] [Footnote 10: On the derivation of this word, whether from [Greek: synedaesis] or [Greek: syntaeresis], see _Athenaum_, 1877, vol. i., pp. 738, 798, vol. iii. pp. 16, 48.] _Synderesis_ is an habitual hold upon primary moral judgments, as, that we must do good, avoid evil, requite benefactors, honour superiors, punish evil-doers. There is a hot controversy as to how these primary moral judgments arise in the mind. The coals of dispute are kindled by the assumption, that these moral judgments must needs have a totally other origin and birth in the mind than speculative first principles, as, that the whole is greater than the part, that two and two are four, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. The assumption is specious, but unfounded. It looks plausible because of this difference, that moral judgments have emotions to wait upon them, speculative judgments have not. Speculative judgments pass like the philosophers that write them down, unheeded in the quiet of their studies. But moral judgments are rulers of the commonwealth: they are risen to as they go by, with majesty preceding and cares coming after. Their presence awakens in us certain emotions, conflicts of passion, as we think of the good that we should do, but have not done, or of the evil that goes unremedied and |
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