Moral Philosophy by S. J. Joseph Rickaby
page 96 of 356 (26%)
page 96 of 356 (26%)
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passion principle is brought gradually to decay.
_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth._, III., x.; St. Thos., 2a 2a, q. 141, art. 2; _ib._, q. 141, art. 3, in corp.; _ib._, q. 142, art. 1; _ib._, q. 143, art. 1, in corp., ad 2, 3; _ib._, q. 161, art. 1, ad 5; _ib._, q. 161, art. 2, in corp.; _ib._, q. 161, art. 6, in corp., ad 1; _ib._, q. 157, art. 1, in corp., ad 3; _ib_, q. 156, art. 3; Ar., _Eth._, VII., viii. SECTION VIII.--_Of Fortitude_. 1. As Temperance is a curb, restraining animal nature in the pursuit of the good to which it goes out most eagerly, namely, life and the means of its continuance, so Fortitude also is a curb, withholding that nature from irrational flight from the evil which it most dreads. Aristotle tells us what that evil is: "Most dreadful of all things is death, for it is the limit, and for the dead man there appears to be no further good nor evil left." (_Eth._, III, vi., b.) Death is truly the limit to human existence: for, though the soul be immortal, the being of flesh and blood, that we call man, is dissolved in death, and, apart from supernatural hope of the resurrection, extinct for ever. Death therefore is the direst of all evils in the animal economy; and as such, is supremely abhorred by the sensitive appetite, which is the animal part of man. Fortitude moderates this abhorrence and fear by the dictate of reason. Reason shows that there are better things than life, and things worse than death, for man in his spiritual capacity as an intellectual and immortal being. |
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