operations he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive warfare.
That steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported
himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the
preceding year did not forsake him, and that sound judgment which
applies to the best advantage those means which are attainable, however
inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan of operations was
adapted to that which he believed his enemy had formed. He was
persuaded either that General Burgoyne, who was then at Quebec, would
endeavor to take Ticonderoga and to penetrate to the Hudson, in which
event General Howe would cooperate with him by moving up that river,
and attempting to possess himself of the forts and high grounds
commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at
New York by sea, after which the combined armies would proceed against
Philadelphia.

To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to
defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York,
and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him
in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such
an arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to
aid each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal
magnitude, which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effect
these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided
between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North
Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed
in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that State for its
protection.

These arrangements being made and the recruits collected, the camp at
Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army