troops, the command of which was given to General Arnold who was then
in Philadelphia employed in the settlement of his accounts.

The first and real object of the campaign on the part of Howe was the
acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey, and
after securing the submission of that State to cross the Delaware on a
portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose and proceed
by land to that city. If, in the execution of this plan, the Americans
could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the advantages of
the royal army must insure a victory. But should Washington decline an
engagement and be again pressed over the Delaware the object would be
as certainly obtained.

Had Howe taken the field before the Continental troops were assembled
this plan might probably have been executed without any serious
obstruction, but the tents and camp equipage expected from Europe did
not arrive until Washington had collected his forces and taken
possession of the strong post on the Heights of Middlebrook. It would
be dangerous to attack him on such advantageous ground, for, although
his camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such
loss as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.

If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp at
Middlebrook, an attempt to cross the Delaware in the face of an army
collected on its western bank, while that under Washington remained
unbroken in his rear, was an experiment of equal danger. It suited the
cautious temper of Howe to devise some other plan of operation to which
he might resort should he be unable to seduce Washington from his
advantageous position.