had determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if
such should be his intention. In that event, he had determined to throw
those impediments only in the way of the hostile army which might
harass and retard its march, and maintaining the high and secure
grounds north of the road to be taken by the enemy, to watch for an
opportunity of striking some important blow with manifest advantage.

Washington was not long in penetrating Howe's designs. "The views of
the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the 17th (June,
1777), "must be to destroy this army and get possession of
Philadelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will not
move that way until they have endeavored to give a severe blow to this
army. The risk would be too great to attempt to cross a river when they
must expect to meet a formidable opposition in front and would have
such a force as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful,
but the probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be
imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon their
heels and will do everything in my power to make the project fatal to
them."

"But, besides the argument in favor of their intending, in the first
place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure,
every appearance contributes to conform the opinion. Had their design
been for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably have
made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken
our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them.
Instead of that they have only advanced to a position necessary to
facilitate an attack on our right, the part in which we are most
exposed. In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as light
as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boas, and bridges