Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This intelligence
strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be to seize the
passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that
river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet Washington
could not permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as to
make a movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His
army, therefore, maintained its station at Middlebrook, but
arrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which
defended the Hudson.

Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops
having relieved Washington from his apprehensions of a sudden march to
Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on the
way to Peekskill, and proceeded with the main body of his army to
Morristown, thus approaching the Highlands of New York without removing
so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain that camp should Howe
indicate an intention to seize it.

Meanwhile Howe prosecuted diligently his plan of embarkation, which was
necessarily attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage
than one up the North river. These circumstances were immediately
communicated to the Eastern States, and Congress was earnestly pressed
to strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase the
obstructions in that river.

In the midst of these appearances certain intelligence was received
that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing
against Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the
main object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the
North river. Under this impression Washington ordered Sullivan to