unite, with a view to turn the right of the Americans and gain their
rear. General Knyphausen's van soon found itself opposed to the light
troops under General Maxwell. A smart conflict ensued. General
Knyphausen reinforced his advanced guard, and drove the Americans
across the rivulet to shelter themselves under their batteries on the
north bank. General Knyphausen ordered some artillery to be placed on
the most advantageous points, and a cannonade was carried on with the
American batteries on the heights beyond the ford.

Meanwhile the left wing of the British crossed the fords above the
Forks. Of this movement General Washington had early notice, but the
information which he received from different quarters, through his raw
and unpracticed scouts, was confused and contradictory, and
consequently his operations were embarrassed. After passing the fords,
Cornwallis took the road to Dilworth, which led him on the American
right. General Sullivan, who had been appointed to guard that quarter,
occupied the heights above Birmingham Church, his left extending to the
Brandywine, his artillery judiciously placed, and his right flank
covered by woods. About four in the afternoon Cornwallis formed the
line of battle and began the attack: for some time the Americans
sustained it with intrepidity, but at length gave way. When Washington
heard the firing in that direction he ordered General Greene, with a
brigade, to support General Sullivan. General Greene marched four miles
in forty-two minutes, but, on reaching the scene of action, he found
General Sullivan's division defeated, and in confusion. He covered the
retreat, and, after some time, finding an advantageous position, he
renewed the battle, and arrested the progress of the pursuing enemy.

General Knyphausen, as soon as he heard the firing of Cornwallis's
division, forced the passage of Chad's ford, attacked the troops