and accuracy of this document I think there can be no doubt.

From the ardor with which Washington had inspired his troops before
this action, it is probable that the conflict would have been more
severe had the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the
British army been less contradictory. Raw troops, changing their ground
in the moment of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are
easily thrown into confusion. This was the critical situation of a part
of Sullivan's division, and was the cause of its breaking before Greene
could be brought up to support it, after which it was impossible to
retrieve the fortune of the day. But had the best disposition of the
troops been made at the time, which subsequent intelligence would
suggest, the action could not have terminated in favor of the
Americans. Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms was
too great to leave them a probable prospect of victory. A battle,
however, was not to be avoided. The opinion of the public and of
Congress demanded it. The loss of Philadelphia, without an attempt to
preserve it, would have excited discontent throughout the country,
which might be productive of serious mischief, and action, though
attended with defeat, provided the loss be not too great, must improve
an army in which not only the military talents, but even the courage of
officers, some of them of high rank, remained to be ascertained.

The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by Congress,
the general, or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that the
British had gained only the ground, and that their loss was still more
considerable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congress
appeared determined to risk another battle for the metropolis of
America. Far from discovering any intention to change their place of
session, they passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and