enabled the enemy to rally.

Washington, writing to his brother John Augustine, says: "If it had not
been for a thick fog, which rendered it so dark at times that we were
not able to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of thirty
yards, we should, I believe, have made a decisive and glorious day of
it. But Providence designed it otherwise, for, after we had driven the
enemy a mile or two, after they were in the utmost confusion and flying
before us in most places, after we were upon the point, as it appeared
to everybody, of grasping a complete victory, our own troops took
fright and fled with precipitation and disorder. How to account for
this I know not, unless, as I before observed, the fog represented
their own friends to them for a reinforcement of the enemy, as we
attacked in different quarters at the same time, and were about closing
the wings of our army when this happened. One thing, indeed,
contributed not a little to our misfortune, and that was a want of
ammunition on the right wing, which began the engagement, and in the
course of two hours and forty minutes, which time it lasted, had, many
of them, expended the forty rounds that they took into the field. After
the engagement we removed to a place about twenty miles from the enemy
to collect our forces together, to take care of our wounded, get
furnished with necessaries again, and be in a better posture either for
offensive or defensive operations. We are now advancing toward the
enemy again, being at this time within twelve miles of them."

Writing to the President of Congress (October 7, 1777) he still imputes
the disaster to the fog: "It is with much chagrin and mortification I
add that every account confirms the opinion I at first entertained,
that our troops retreated at the instant when victory was declaring
herself in our favor. The tumult, disorder, and even despair, which, it