part of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might be
drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But Washington had just
grounds to apprehend that before these reinforcements could arrive Howe
would gain possession of the forts and remove the obstructions to the
navigation of the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive
for vigorous attempts to relieve Fort Mifflin. But the relative force
of the armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against
Philadelphia, and, above all, the reflection that a defeat might
disable him from meeting his enemy in the field even after the arrival
of the troops expected from the north, determined Washington not to
hazard a second attack under existing circumstances.

To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Washington
dispatched Colonel Hamilton to General Gates, with directions to
represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania, and to
urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more importance,
immediately to send the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to
aid the army of the middle department. These orders were not
peremptory, because it was possible that some other object (as the
capture of New York) still more interesting than the expulsion of
General Howe from Philadelphia might be contemplated by Gates; and
Washington meant not to interfere with the accomplishment of such
object.

On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable
part of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates had
detained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be made
in the winter against Ticonderoga. Having made such arrangements with
Putnam as he supposed would secure the immediate march of a large body
of Continental troops from that station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to