position. His right was covered by the Delaware, his left by the
Schuylkill, his rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by
the city of Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubts extending
from river to river and connected by an abatis and by circular works.
It would be indispensably necessary to carry all these redoubts, since
to leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns while
engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia would be extremely
hazardous. Supposing the redoubts carried and the British army driven
into the town, yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of
storming a town. The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly
superior to that of the Americans, which would attack in front, while
the brick houses would be lined with musketeers, whose fire must thin
the ranks of the assailants.

A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole
depended, was that the British rear should be surprised by the corps
descending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of too many
favorable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the
position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir
William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable that not even
his embarkation would be made unnoticed, but it was presuming a degree
of negligence which ought not to be assumed to suppose that he could
descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movement
should be observed, the whole plan would be comprehended, since it
would never be conjectured that Greene was to attack singly.

If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the
total loss of the 2,000 men in the rear must follow, and General Howe
would maintain his superiority through the winter.