militia. The parties first attacked were driven in, but the enemy
reinforcing in numbers and Washington unwilling to move from the
heights and engage on the ground which was the scene of the skirmish,
declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled
to retreat.

Howe continued to maneuver toward the flank and in front of the left
wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter in
full force Washington made such changes in the disposition of his
troops as the occasion required, and the day was consumed in these
movements. In the course of it Washington rode through every brigade of
his army, delivering in person his orders respecting the manner of
receiving the enemy, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the
bayonet, and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his
countenance, as well as by his words, to a vigorous performance of
their duty. The dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to
attack him the ensuing morning, but in the afternoon of the 8th the
British suddenly filed off from their right, which extended beyond the
American left, and retreated to Philadelphia. The parties detached to
harass their rear could not overtake it. [3]

The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the official
letter of General Howe, rather exceeded 100 in killed, wounded, and
missing, and was sustained principally in the skirmish of the 7th
(December, 1777) in which Major Morris fell.

On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with
superior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force of
the British was then stated at 12,000 men. Stedman, the historian, who
then belonged to Howe's army, states its number to have been 14,000.